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Executive Summary 
Following the 2011 elections, one of the most pressing challenges for the President, government ministries and 
international organizations will be boosting youth incomes and employment, especially that of high-risk youth. 
What kinds of programs can boost employment and incomes and reduce the risk of social instability? This report 
details findings from an impact evaluation of a reintegration and agricultural livelihoods program for high-risk Libe-
rian youth, and draws out lessons for employment policies in 2012 and beyond. This report builds on recent IPA 
studies of rural conflict resolution and civic education programs, and analysis of conflict trends and patterns in 
Liberia. Future IPA reports will look at innovative programs for urban youth.  
Context and Program 
In 2003, Liberia’s 14-year civil war finally came to an end. The war was disruptive and destructive, displacing the 
majority of Liberia’s 3 million inhabitants, halting economic activity, deepening poverty, and depriving a generation 
of basic education. The bulk of Liberia’s youth remain poor and underemployed. While the security situation has 
steadily improved since 2003, many rural youth continue to make their living through unlawful activities, including 
unlicensed mining, rubber tapping, or logging. Many of them are ex-combatants, and some remain in loose armed 
group structures.  
 
The government, the UN, and NGOs fear that these 
youth are a possible source of instability. How to 
promote legal and sustainable employment among 
such high-risk youth? And how to reduce the risk of 
violence or re-recruitment in future? 
 
Agriculture is and will continue to be a major source 
of employment and income for rural Liberians. But 
can high-risk youth be transformed into stable and 
successful smallholder farmers? The international 
NGO Landmine Action (LMA, now known as Action 
on Armed Violence) runs an intensive, best practices 
agricultural training program, targeting ex-
combatants and other high-risk youth in rural hot 
spots.  
 
LMA recruited ex-combatants and other high-risk youth and offered them several months of skills training and psy-
chosocial counseling, along with a start-up package, to give youth a peaceful, sustainable, and legal alternative to 
illicit resource extraction, ease their reintegration into society, reduce the risk of their re-recruitment into crime 
and insurrection in the future, and to improve security in hotspot communities. 
The research 
From 2009 to 2011, Christopher Blattman (Yale) and Jeannie Annan (International Rescue Committee) worked with 
IPA (www.poverty-action.org) and LMA to do a quantitative and qualitative study of the LMA program. The center-
piece of the research strategy was a randomized evaluation. The NGO recruited 1,330 youth, and the researchers 
randomly assigned these to either “treatment” (receiving the program) or “control” (not receiving the program). 
By comparing the “treatment” group to the random “control” group 18 months after the program, we can see the 
effect of the intervention on agricultural livelihoods, shifts from illicit to legal employment, poverty, social integra-
tion, aggression, and potential for future instability. As researchers, our aim is not simply to evaluate the success of 
a single program, but also to use the findings to weigh in on the broader implications for security and poverty re-
duction in Liberia and beyond. 
Unemployed and idle in Red Light, Montserrado County 
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Additional questions we address include: 
 Are rural youth interested in agriculture? 
 What kinds of agricultural support can help them expand their activities?  
 Can anti-poverty programs reduce illegal activities, peacefully open up concessions, and reduce the pro-
pensity for crime and violence? 
 What are the most cost-effective means to reduce poverty and improve security in rural towns and villag-
es? 
Turning High Risk-Youth into Farmers: Increased engagement in agriculture 
The first and most obvious place to look for impact is engagement in agriculture. Here we see a large and signifi-
cant impact of the program.  
 Agriculture is common even without the intervention. Roughly half of the control group is engaged in 
agriculture, though in the majority of cases it is subsistence farming only.  
 More than a year after completion of the program, program participants are at least a quarter more likely 
than the control group to be engaged in agriculture, and 37% more likely to have sold crops. 
 In general there is also a high level of interest in agriculture among these rural youth—both those who re-
ceived the program and those who did not.  
 
o 94% of the control group (who did not 
participate in the program) believes that 
someone can make a good living farming, 
81% think farming is a good thing for 
them, 76% are interested in farming in 
future, and 89% are interested in raising 
animals in future.  
 
o These attitudes are all significantly higher 
among program participants, in particular 
the interest in farming in future.  
Reducing Engagement in Illicit Activities: Participation rates unchanged, but participation levels dropped 
The program not only aimed to increase agricultural activity and productivity, but also to shift high-risk youth away 
from illicit livelihoods, such as unlicensed or illegal mining, logging, rubber-tapping, and hunting. The researchers 
measured youth’s participation rates (i.e. whether youth had done x in the past month), and participation levels 
(i.e. number of hours spent doing x).  
 
 Prior to the program, in 2009, 44% of youth were engaged in at least one of these illicit activities, falling to 
42% two years later (in both the treatment and control group).  
 Overall, rates of illicit mining went up in both the treatment and control group, most likely because of sky-
rocketing gold prices over the course of the program and study. 
 
The program had little impact on rates of participation in illicit activities like mining, but those who participated in 
the program do spend fewer hours engaged in illicit activities. 
A program participant displays his produce, Bong County 
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 There is little difference in participation rates between those that participated in the program and those 
that did not.  
 While overall illicit activities decline slightly, the incidence of mining increases in both the treatment and 
control groups by similar amounts—probably because of high and rising prices for gold. 
 Nevertheless, participation levels fall among the treatment group, as agricultural hours seem to substitute 
somewhat for hours spent in illicit activities. 
Poverty Reduction: Little change in current income and expenditures, but a large rise in durable wealth 
Agricultural employment and engagement is higher among beneficiaries, but how successful are these new agricul-
tural activities?  
 
Overall, the evidence suggests that cash cropping provides periodic windfalls from sales, and that these are mainly 
invested in durable assets (and not necessarily in agricultural inputs or equipment). But there is little effect on ob-
served income or current expenditures (both measured for last month), and other measures of economic ad-
vancement.  
 The program aimed to develop not only legal livelihoods, but sustainable and, ideally, lucrative ones. We 
see a sizable increase in average wealth from the program, especially in household durable assets, but no 
change in current income, savings or spending for the average program participant.  
 The very top earners in the treatment group, however, do show more statistically significant higher earn-
ings than the top earners in the control group.  
 These agricultural enterprises are sustainable and profitable but their current revenue generation and 
employment generation is modest. 
Modest improvements in social engagement, citizenship, and stability 
The residential training experience, the life skills and psychosocial programming, the new livelihoods, and reinser-
tion assistance were also designed to increase social integration. We observe small but positive improvements 
across most measures. While not all of the estimated impacts are large enough to be statistically significant, they 
nevertheless suggest a small but broad-based reduction in alienation and some gains in stability.  
 
Do we observe reductions in crime and violence? There are at least two reasons to expect the program could re-
duce both.  
 First, relocation to the training center (and, ultimately, a new village) can replace previous ties to ex-
combatants and former commanders by counselors, other motivated students, and farmers. The goal is to 
help participants adopt a new set of norms, reference groups, and networks, and encourage a process of 
socialization from ‘combatant’ into community life.  
 The second rationale is economic: to give ex-combatants and war-affected youth alternatives to their cur-
rent illicit activities or low-return alternatives, and thus dissuade them from future violence.  
 
The evidence on aggression and crime is somewhat equivocal, however, and does not point to a significant reduc-
tion in illegal or aggressive behaviors among program participants.  
 Looking at interpersonal aggression and crime, we see that by some measures program participants are 
slightly more violent and open to crime, and by other measures they appear less aggressive.  
 In most cases the impacts are not statistically significant. This remains true even when we restrict our 
analysis to those men who, at baseline, showed a high propensity for aggression and instability.  
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Less likely to have been interested in, or mobilized into, the election violence in Cote d’Ivoire 
Conflict broke out in Cote d’Ivoire shortly before we launched the evaluation of the program. We asked subjects 
about levels of interest in recruitment, connections to people recruited, and activities like attending, or even 
knowing of, meetings and other recruitment activities. 
 
Rates of interest in the violence and mobilization were fairly low, but they were especially low among program 
participants – they tended to report a third less interest in or links to recruiters and recruitment activities. 
 
Our interpretation is that aggressive responses to the program are highly heterogeneous—many who participated 
succeeded and so reduce their interest in armed insurrection. But because these traits are difficult to measure, and 
because not all respond to treatment in this way, the average impacts are large but not statistically precise. Given 
the difficulty of shifting such behaviors, however, we regard these impacts of the program as extremely promising. 
 
Bringing in evidence from other livelihoods programs 
The program focuses on providing agricultural skills and start-up tools to encourage a transition from illicit livelih-
oods to farming and animal husbandry. We are not aware of similar programs for high-risk populations, let alone 
hard evidence on their success or failure. Agricultural assistance programs can show high returns but they typically 
target more established farmers.  
 
While evidence on agricultural interventions is limited, there is a broader base of evidence on programs that focus 
on providing business skills and capital for small income generating activities and microenterprises. 
 “Microenterprises” include non-farm employment (like vending items, operating a kiosk, a vocation, or 
handicraft production) plus agricultural enterprises such as animal raising or trading (i.e. at other points in 
the agriculture value chain).  
 These evaluated programs have targeted rural ultra-poor or urban high-risk populations, but focus on 
non-farm employment. We summarize some of the evidence on these interventions, including evidence 
from a growing number of randomized trials of the very poor, excluded and (in some cases) high risk 
youth. 
 
Rigorous evaluations of employment and income generation programs in Africa, South Asia, and elsewhere have 
shown promising results.  
 Poor people appear to have opportunities to earn high returns to capital, but with limited assets or the 
ability to borrow, they have difficulty achieving them. Programs that have provided capital— either in-
kind assets, credit, or cash—to poor individuals have observed annual returns on those investments of 30 
to 60%, and sometimes higher.  
 The returns to skills, however, appear to be lower than the returns to capital, suggesting that credit and 
capital may be the scarcer resource. 
 Indeed, to promote legal employment generation and poverty alleviation, a growing base of evidence 
stresses the cost-effectiveness of financial access and capital or cash transfers to the poor. These pro-
grams tend to perform especially relative to the cost of implementation.  
 Whether these poverty alleviation and employment programs reduce the potential for social instability 




Recommendations for reintegration, livelihoods, and poverty alleviation programs in Liberia 
This program and Liberia’s government and non-governmental sector share a common objective:  to promote le-
gal, sustainable, and lucrative employment opportunities for youth, steer them away from illicit activities or occu-
pation of concessions, and reduce poverty and the potential for instability.  
 
To do so most successfully, we argue that these legal employment alternatives must be labor-intensive, provide 
opportunities for full-time work, and have high revenue-generating potential. 
 
In agriculture, external evidence suggests that the returns to capital are higher than the returns to skill.  
 Given scarce aid and resources for employment-generation, the most cost-effective means of expanding 
the returns to smallholder commercial agriculture probably involves a shift in emphasis from skills training 
towards capital.  
 More of both are clearly better per beneficiary, but the opportunity cost may be high in terms of other 
beneficiaries not served. 
 These are conjecture based on a thin base of evidence across African farm and non-farm enterprises, 
however, and so we advocate for experimentation in future agricultural programming in Liberia, to under-
stand which packages are most cost-effective in terms of legal employment generation. 
 
Our qualitative study of the program impacts suggests that access to markets may have been an important con-
straint on success. Our research does not speak directly to this question, however, and more investigation on this 
point will be needed. But agricultural training programs should stress to trainees the need for proximity to mar-
kets, and encourage graduates to settle closer to major markets both for inputs and produce. 
 
Where skills training may be most effective is where graduates can be linked to concession owners and agribusi-
ness as employees. This could include out-grower schemes or placement in commercial farms or plantations. 
 
Finally, we view rural non-farm enterprises as a major short-term source of poverty alleviation and legal livelih-
oods.  
 Looking at a variety of impact evaluations of ultra-poor, or post conflict youth, we see high returns of 30 
to 60% on enterprise development support, including business skills training and cash or in-kind grants. 
Village- town- and city-based microenterprises are also viable economic alternatives for youth, one that 
the evidence suggests can yield high potential economic returns, modest social returns, and the potential 
to reduce crime and aggression among unstable populations.  
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1. Introduction and background 
Poor and unemployed young men are widely considered a threat to political stability, often blamed for everything 
from fights to crime, riots and revolutions. Ex-combatants cause policymakers special worry. Not only do they have 
professional experience in warfare, but their social networks are dense with potential recruiters. War may also 
have left them poorer or more traumatized than their peers. Each of these factors has the potential to raise the 
risk of rebellion, crime, or other aggression, risks greatest in weak states and uncertain economic climates like that 
of Liberia. 
 
In Liberia, a national demobilization program successfully demobilized tens of thousands of ex-combatants, but 
many thousands of young men and women – often the hard core – were poorly served or unserved by the official 
program. These youth remain underemployed and many are engaged in illicit activities, such as unlicensed mining, 
logging, rubber tapping, and marijuana production. In some cases, loose armed group chain-of-command struc-
tures remain in place, making youth susceptible to re-recruitment. At the outset of the LMA program, the govern-
ment and the UN peacekeeping mission (UNMIL) regarded these ‘hot spots’ as a major threat to peace and stabili-
ty, and they continue to be a source of concern. 
 
Ex-combatants and other high-risk youth are just one particularly precarious population in Liberia. The bulk of Li-
berians are young, poor, and underemployed. Following the 2011 elections, one of the most pressing challenges 
for the President, government ministries and international organization will be boosting youth incomes and em-
ployment, especially that of high-risk youth.  
 
Key policy questions include: 
 What kinds of programs can boost employment and incomes and reduce the risk of social instability? 
 How can policymakers break illicit networks and steer high-risk youth towards legal, lucrative, and sus-
tainable employment?  
 Do high risk youth need special programs or attention? 
 
This report studies a pioneering NGO program that targets ex-combatants and other high risk youth in Liberian hot 
spots and provides them with the skills and tools to engage in commercial smallholder agriculture. In 2006-07, the 
international NGO Landmine Action, or LMA (now known as Action On Armed Violence, or AOAV
1
) worked with the 
UN and the Ministry of Agriculture to develop an innovative program of agricultural livelihoods development and 
social reintegration for the hard core ex-combatants in Liberia’s hot spots.  
 
Innovations for Poverty Action (IPA) is a research NGO that works with leading academics and organizations, using 
rigorous techniques to develop, test and scale up proven solutions to real-world problems faced by the poor.
2
 The 
researchers partnered with IPA and LMA to study the program and draw out lessons for youth employment and 
stabilization policies in 2012 and beyond. 
 
Our objective is not merely to understand the effects of a single program, but to use the program to help answer 
some basic questions in post-conflict recovery and peacebuilding: the constraints facing youth who pursue agricul-
tural livelihoods; the competing opportunities for high-risk youth; the determinants of effective poverty allevia-
tion; the links between employment and potential for aggression; and the links between employment and psy-
chosocial well-being.  
 
                                                                
1
 See http://aoav.org.uk/ 
2
 See http://www.poverty-action.org/ 
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This report complements recent IPA studies of rural conflict resolution and civic education programs
3
 and a recent 
analysis of conflict trends and patterns in Liberia.
4
 Future IPA reports will look at innovative programs for urban 
youth in Liberia. In the final sections, we also bring in IPA and other related research and evidence on post-conflict 
youth employment.  
2. The Program 
The LMA intervention is broader and more intensive than most ex-combatant reintegration programs, and is de-
signed to rectify some of the main failings of prior demobilization programs: it is oriented towards agriculture (the 
largest source of employment in the country); it provides both human and physical capital; and it integrates eco-
nomic with psychosocial assistance. It is also targeted at hot spots that present the most immediate security con-
cerns. 
 
The program had five official aims: 
1. Rebuild and transfer to government full ownership and management of training centers 
2. Improve security and implementation of rule of law in hot spots 
3. Help ex-combatants formerly dependent on illegal livelihoods pursue legal and sustainable livelihoods 
4. Help beneficiaries become better citizens, with greater respect for rule of law and improved social and 
communication skills 
5. Reinsert and reintegrate ex-combatants into communities away from former hot spots 
LMA rebuilt an agricultural training center that was destroyed by the war in the west of the country, in Bong Coun-
ty, which can accommodate 400 students, and built another center in the east, in Sinoe County, which can ac-
commodate 200. The Bong class ran from November 2009 to March 2010 and the Sinoe class ran from September 
to December 2009. Each program offered a package of services, at an average cost of approximately $1250 per 
student.  
 
The program has 6 main components: 
1. Three to four months of coursework and practical training in rice and vegetable farming, animal husban-
dry, and rubber and palm oil production; 
2. Basic literacy and numeracy training; 
3. Formal and informal psycho-social counseling and conflict management, led by former combatants turned 
counselors and mentors; 
4. Meals, lodging, clothing, basic medical care, and personal items while in residence; 
5. Facilitation of re-entry and access to land into any community of their choice; 
6. A two-stage package of agricultural tools and supplies, tailored to the specific type of agriculture chosen by 
the trainee, and worth approximately $200. 
 
The program aimed to promote peace and security at two levels: at the community or ‘hotspot’ level and at the 
level of the individual beneficiary as well.  
 
                                                                
3
 Christopher Blattman, Alexandra Hartman, and Robert Blair, "Can we teach peace and conflict resolution? Results from a 
randomized evaluation of the Community Empowerment Program (CEP) in Liberia " (New Haven, CT: Innovations for Poverty 
Action, 2011). See full report at http://www.poverty-action.org/project/0139. 
4
 Robert Blair, Christopher Blattman, and Alexandra Hartman, "Patterns of Conflict and Cooperation in Liberia (Part 1): Results 
from a Longitudinal Study," (New Haven, CT: Yale University & Innovations for Poverty Action, 2011). 
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© Glenna Gordon At the community level, the program is designed to 
give incentives for leaders or groups to peacefully 
hand over resource concessions, break existing 
chains of command, shift people out of illicit re-
source extraction and either remove high-risk youth 
permanently from the hotspot or, if they return, 
give them legal employment alternatives. The pro-
gram aims to cool the hot spots and permit the re-
sumption of state authority.   
 
At the individual level, the program is designed to 
provide ex-combatants and other war-affected 
youth with sustainable, legal, and lucrative alterna-
tives to their current illegal activities, facilitate their 
reintegration into society, and reduce their ability to 
be re-recruited into crime or insurrection, thus con-
tributing positively to enduring peace in Liberia. 
  
The researchers, and this study, are best positioned to study the individual rather than the community impacts of 
the program, and the report focuses on these objectives in particular. We investigate the direct aims of the 
project, as well as indirect and unplanned outcomes for participants. 
 
3. Target Population 
For the Sinoe program, LMA principally target ex-combatants living in 35 communities on and around the Sinoe 
Rubber Plantation, an enclave which, until a few months before the program, had been occupied and managed 
illegally by a rebel commander, and was expected to revert to state control in the coming months. 
 
For the Bong program, LMA focused mainly on ex-combatants from 
60 communities in Gbarpolu County in areas known mainly for small-
scale (and often illicit) diamond and gold mining, logging, and hunt-
ing. Such communities are potential hotspots because they attract 
young men from around the country with an interest in making “fast 
money.” As long as the price of minerals remains high and illicit min-
ers continue to operate, these men may not pose an immediate 
threat. If the situation changes, however, these high concentrations 
of young men may be vulnerable to recruitment for criminal or vio-
lent activities. The Bong program also targeted ex-combatants in and 
around Ganta where, at the time of registration, there were signs of 
political instability in Guinea and reports of recruitment of ex-
combatants. LMA also registered a small number of people from the 
villages adjoining the training site, in order to maintain community 
goodwill. 
 
To mobilize the target population, LMA sent a registration team to 
each site to identify risky populations, publicize the program, and 
screen interested persons using a detailed registration questionnaire 
that focused on war experiences and current activities. IPA staff as-
sisted in site selection and research. 
 
Program center in Salala, Bong County 
Youth in Red Light, Montserrado County 
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On average, the target population was 30 years of age and had nearly 6 years of education. 69% lived with a 
spouse and 64% lived with children. Before the program, 93% had done some kind of income-generating work in 
the previous week, although seldom a full week of work, and they earned $50 on average in the previous 4 weeks. 
 
Respondents were engaged in a wide variety of activities prior to the program. Figure 1a illustrates the major activ-
ities self-reported at baseline. Respondents were typically involved in multiple income-generating activities--
typically two to four at any one time. The most commonly reported activities were casual labor (66%), agriculture 
(63%), and petty trading (40%). Respondents were also engaged in a number of generally unlicensed (and hence 
illicit) activities: hunting to sell (22%); mining (14%), rubber tapping (12%), and logging (9%). (We suspect a small 
proportion were involved in petty crime, prostitution or drug sales, but do not have data on these activities.) In all, 
96% of respondents reported they were engaged in at least one legal livelihood, and 44% reported that they were 




Some non-combatant youth were also targeted by the program, especially youth who were considered potentially 
as unstable or deserving as the ex-combatants. All are war-affected, and a majority were engaged with an armed 
group in some fashion, but only 65% of those registered for the program, for instance, carried a gun on an armed 
force, and just 16% were on the front lines. 
 
In general, potentially high-risk youth were targeted. Figure 1b illustrates self-reported data before the program. 
Nearly two thirds were fighters (i.e. carried a gun). At the time, half said that more than half their friends were 
other ex-combatants, 13% had close relations with a former commander, and 4% were actively receiving support 









Casual work Agriculture Petty 
Business 
Hunting Logging Rubber 
tapping 




At least one 
legal 
activity 
Figure 1a: Proportion of respondents who did "__" prior to the program  




4. The Evaluation 
Can agricultural training and start-up assistance provide high-risk youth with an alternative, stable and lucrative 
livelihood? Will this reduce illicit activities and lower the risk of violence, aggression, crime, or re-recruitment? 
Finally, what can such programs tell us about agricultural employment and poverty alleviation strategies generally?  
 
To answer these questions, the lead researchers and IPA worked with LMA to rigorously evaluate their program 
using both qualitative and quantitative methods. The purpose of the study is not simply to evaluate the success of 
any one program, but also to generate generalizable findings for post-conflict recovery, peace-building and poverty 
alleviation. 
Qualitative research 
For the qualitative investigation, two Liberian and one American research assistant followed 37 members of the 
treatment and 13 members of the control group at regular intervals over two years. The qualitative researchers 
attempted to interview participants before, during and after the intervention, often multiple times. The analysis of 
this vast store of qualitative data is ongoing, and preliminary findings are reflected in this evaluation. 
Quantitative research 
The core of the study was a randomized, survey-based evaluation of the program. Demand outstripped the supply 
of spaces in the program, and so registrants in each community were admitted to the program by lottery, provid-
ing a random “treatment” and “control” group for comparison. Of 1330 people registered and surveyed
5
, 790 were 
offered the program, and 254 declined (or were unable to be found).
6
 To assess impacts, we estimate the effect of 
the treatment on the treated only (i.e. the effect of the program on those who do not decline).
7
 
                                                                
5
 We omit from this analysis people who were registered, surveyed, but were not experimentally assigned to the program. 
These include 59 generals and women in the Sinoe program who were automatically admitted. We do not have a control group 
for comparison, and so omit them from the analysis. Data are available on these participants, however, since w tracked them as 
well. Women and generals were randomized into the larger program at Tumutu, and are included in the current analysis. 
6
 The greatest source of non-compliance comes from individuals who refused to come at pick-up. The training is a four month 










Has ever carried a gun 
Has ever been on the frontline 
More than half of his friends are ex-combattants 
Former commander(s) gives him support or jobs 
Has close relations with a former commander 
Reports to a former commander 
Thinks there'll be more war in the country again 
Would become a fighter if there was another war 
Would consider fighting war in a neighboring country 




We collected extensive survey data on registrants several weeks prior to the program. We followed them up 16 to 
20 months later, roughly 12 to 16 months after program completion. Despite massive migration, with intensive 
tracking we found nearly 93% for the endline survey. To provide an incentive for control group members to main-
tain contact with IPA for surveying purposes, and as compensation for their time (approximately 2 hours at each 
survey), a mobile phone worth approximately $18 was given to each control group member upon completion of 
the survey. 
 
Before and after the program, we collected detailed data on economic activities (especially engagement in agricul-
ture), expenditures and assets, family, physical and psychological health, political attitudes, attitudes towards vi-
olence, aggressive behaviors, and war and program experiences. All data are self-reported. 
 
This represents the first randomized evaluation of a post-conflict reintegration program for high risk youth. The 
number of subjects is large enough that we expected to be able to detect with statistical precision changes larger 
than 10% relative to the control group. We report all impacts, large and small, statistically significant and not. In 
general, “small” impacts (changes less than 10%) will be imprecise, meaning we will not be able to say for certain 
they are not zero. A short statistics primer is provided in an appendix. 
 
Strengths and limitations of the methodology 
Since entry into the program was randomized, any differences between program participants (the treatment 
group) and those who were not invited to attend (the control group) can be attributed to the program. This is the 
chief strength of the randomized controlled trial approach. 
We should first note that this is a medium-term assessment, 15 months after the program conclusion, after two to 
three agricultural seasons. As we discuss below, 15 months is generally proven sufficient to see improvements in 
non-farm self-employment, or with existing farmers, but it is possible that new farmers (especially in a post-
conflict context) may take longer to see impacts to appear.  
Second, in some instances we observe small or medium impacts, or treatment effects, but the impact is not “statis-
tically significant” at conventional levels (see the appendix for an explanation of technical terms). In these cases it 
is customary to follow standard scientific practice and mute our confidence in the impact. We usually take such 
evidence as suggestive of an impact, but not assuredly so.  
Even so, it is important to note that an absence of evidence is not necessarily evidence of absence. What we esti-
mate is a confidence interval. In some cases the confidence interval only includes small or modest effects. In these 
instances we can be more confident that the impact was low. In other instances, the confidence interval includes 
fairly large effects, positive or negative. In cases where the average treatment effect is large, but the confidence 
interval includes zero, we especially cannot rule out large impacts. 
Finally, while rigorous, note that the evaluation method relies on people’s self-reported data. Measurement error 
and misreporting is a risk, and will have small to serious effects depending on the nature of that misreporting: 
 Small measurement error. If misreporting is idiosyncratic, and if treated and control individuals are equal-
ly likely to misreport, then it will reduce our precision but any measurement error will cancel out and not 
affect the size of our impact estimates. 
                                                                                                                                                                                                              
compliance was especially difficult for household heads, parents of small children, those with small businesses or farms, those 
with bosses who did not want them to leave (usually in mining or rubber production) ,and those with outstanding debts in their 
community. Non-compliance was especially high in Sinoe both because the program was new (and hence suspicious) and be-
cause of the delayed start and hurried pick-up. 
7
 For a detailed description of the research design, see the full paper and analysis: Annan, Jeannie and Christopher Blattman. 
2011. “Can swords be turned into ploughshares? Experimental evidence from an ex-combatant reintegration program in Libe-
ria.” Unpublished working paper, Yale University. 
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 Medium measurement error. If people systematically underreport success in both the treatment and 
control group (say, because they hope for more benefits), we will tend to underestimate the impact of the 
program by a modest amount. We believe this to be the most likely source of error. 
 Serious measurement error. We are most worried if treated subjects misreport more than control sub-
jects. If so, our estimated impacts will confuse the real impact of the program with impacts of the pro-
gram on whether people are honest. We might worry, for instance, that people underreport their success 
in the hopes of more benefits. If control subjects have just as much reason to underreport as treated sub-
jects however, then this is a less serious concern. 
 
Our qualitative work is designed to understand and minimize these forms of measurement error, but they exist. In 
addition, certain effects of the training may be difficult, if not impossible, to measure with survey questions, or 
may not emerge until months or years after the program implementation and thus are not captured by the evalua-
tion. 
5. Qualitative observations 
Based on our observational and qualitative data, the program appears to have been highly popular, and imparted 
valuable skills to program participants. We also observed, qualitatively, a remarkable improvement in confidence 
and respect. Upon return, a majority approached farming with vigor but, like many Liberian farmers, faced a num-
ber of difficulties and constraints that may have impeded short term success. We describe these observational 
results in order to help us understand and interpret the quantitative impact analysis to follow. 
 
The residential training program appeared to be both carefully implemented and popular. Classroom and practical 
instruction were intensive, hands-on, and appeared to be pitched at an appropriate speed and level. Three to four 
months of training is not enough time to master skills, but is far greater than most farmers receive in Africa. Stu-
dents seem to have acquired beginner and intermediate knowledge in modern farm practices appropriate for 
small scale cash cropping and animal husbandry—such as more advanced cropping and animal care techniques, 
seed germination and transplanting skills, fertilizer, pesticide and vaccine knowledge—seldom possessed by subsis-
tence and lay farmers. 
 
The psychosocial component also appears to have been well-implemented and especially valuable to the students. 
Roughly half of program participants reported that the psychosocial training or one-on-one counseling was the 
part of the program that most changed their life. Students entering the program often came from peer groups 
where conflicts were frequently settled by violence. While severe psychological trauma and depression was infre-
quent, few had come to terms with their war experiences and fewer still operated easily in a peacetime environ-
ment. The residential program provided a transitional space in which the people could accustom themselves to a 
new set of norms and behaviors. The counseling and counselors encouraged this process.  
 
Strikes, communal grievances, and even the threat of violence were common occurrences on the training sites. 
While the events were disruptive, these were largely productive opportunities for the students to learn how to 
work out grievances and exercise voice in a peaceful manner, and contributed to the changes in behavior. 
 
Our qualitative observation of these students suggests that a majority became more settled, composed, and confi-
dent over the course of the program. They learned to live better in groups and according to rules, and to settle 
disagreements non-violently.  
 
The vast majority of students graduated from the program, and only a small number needed to be expelled or left 
on their own accord. At graduation, students had little trouble identifying communities where they would like to 
resettle and start a farm, and land was generally plentiful and available. Communities generally appeared proud of 
their new (or returned) residents and both envious and in admiration of the skills acquired. The students them-
 
8 
selves were commonly proud of their participation, and their training t-shirts, ID cards, and certificates were marks 
of pride. 
 
As we will see in the next section, more than two thirds of program participants were doing agriculture for them-
selves or another at the time of surveying, and nearly two-thirds planted crops or raised animals after returning 
from the program. But program participants faced a number of challenges after training and return, and qualitative 
visits suggest that a large number of graduates were having difficulty establishing successful farming or raising an-
imals.  
 
First, some graduates, especially those who came from and returned to Gbarpolu, returned to remote communi-
ties with large local markets but difficult road access and consequently limited access to external markets and sup-
plies. Distance meant that new or replacement tools, seeds and other inputs were unavailable or expensive, and 
transporting any produce to market was difficult and costly. These problems are faced by remote farmers across 
the country. 
 
Second, agriculture is a tough and risky enterprise, and many students reported difficulties in their first seasons. 
Some had trouble clearing enough land since the brush is thick and many people do not have access to a plow or 
capital to hire one. Pests and water and other problems were also mentioned. This led to lower success on aver-
age, with high variance across people, at least after just two or three growing seasons. 
 
Third, graduates were relatively poor and had limited assets, cash, or access to credit. The program provided a 
fairly comprehensive and generous set of skills and inputs. But if seeds spoiled or tools broke they were difficult to 
replace, and participants seldom had funds to buy added inputs, to transport goods to and from markets, or to hire 
or mobilize people to help them clear land. The latter is apparently especially important for women, who by cus-
tom and by physical constraints seldom clear land. It is not fully apparent how important these cash and capital 
constraints were to success. We return to the subject below in our analysis of impacts. 
 
Finally, some graduates reported problems with the reintegration materials received. Those who chose animal 
husbandry, especially chickens, generally received the construction materials but, due to national supply problems, 
had not received chicks at the time of the survey. A cash equivalent was being distributed during and after the sur-
vey, but because of the timing this is not reflected in the results. On occasion, therefore, when evaluating program 
impacts we will consider the impacts on chicken-raisers separately. Of those who chose crops (mainly vegetable 
farming), about half reported that some of the materials received were spoiled or quickly broke, including seeds 
and tools. It’s difficult to confirm the extent and seriousness of these claims, and LMA contests the accuracy of the 
reporting on reintegration packages and numbers of spoilt packages. We share their suspicions of these reports. 
Nevertheless, spoiled seeds were especially commonly reported, and may have been widespread (either due to 
supply problems or perhaps storage and treatment by trainees upon receipt). It may also be possible that program 
graduates blame any problems with their farm on spoiled seeds, even if it is not the real cause. At the same time, 
seed growing is a skill most learned and is not too difficult or costly to implement, and so while this could have 
slowed success, it should not have been a major barrier. 
 
We return to the subject of agricultural and economic success below, after looking at average impacts and pat-
terns of variation in these impacts. 
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6. Impacts on program participants 
A. Pursuit of legitimate agricultural livelihoods 
The first and most obvious place to look for impact is engagement in agriculture. Here we see a significant impact 
of the program. More than a year after completion of the program, program participants are at least a quarter 




Agriculture is already strikingly common, even among the control group. Asked about the current or last season, 
nearly half of the control group cleared land and planted crops, and more than a quarter sold crops or raised ani-
mals. While we do not have the same detailed data on agricultural activity before the program, what we have sug-
gests that the control group increased their agriculture activity over the course of the study, probably as a process 
of settling down in a more stable political climate, or perhaps due to changing economic opportunities. 
 
Nevertheless, program participants saw significant increases over the control group. Figure 2 shows the propor-
tions of people engaged in agricultural activities. Program participants were more likely to clear land, produce their 
own seedlings, plant crops, sell crops, and raise animals. In the case of planting and selling crops, program partici-
pants are about 50% more likely to report this activity than controls. All but the increase in animal raising are sta-
tistically significant.  
 
Figure 3 displays the percentage impacts of the program on other indicators of agricultural activity. For instance, 
roughly 76 percent of the control group and 87 percent of the program participants said they are interested in 
farming in the future. The difference (of 11 percentage points) represents a 15% increase relative to the control 
group. It is this percentage change that we graph for most outcomes. The diamond gives the average treatment 
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In general there is a high level of interest in agriculture. 94% of the control group believes that someone can make 
a good living farming, 81% think farming is a good thing for them, 76% are interested in farming in future, and 89% 
are interested in raising animals in future. These attitudes are all significantly higher among program participants, 
in particular the interest in farming in future. The one exception—the question, “Can you make a good living farm-
ing?”—had nearly unanimous support from both groups, providing no room for a treatment effect. These opinion 
levels ought to put (somewhat) to rest notions that Liberian youth are uninterested in agriculture.  
 
The real effect of the program is to turn these interests into action. When we look at self-reported engagement in 
agriculture this and last season in general, we see substantial impacts—an increase of 23 to 24% relative to con-
trols.  
 
Finally, consistent with the above pattern, we 
see an average 18% increase in hours engaged 
in agriculture and an increase in acres under 
cultivation, though neither result is statistically 
precise (meaning the confidence interval in-
cludes zero). The increase in employment 
hours is statistically significant for male pro-
gram participants, however. We take this to 
suggest that treatment increases the likelihood 
of engaging in agriculture most of all, but also 
increases the level of work once agriculture is 
selected. 
 
Data analysis not shown here reveals some 
other interesting patterns. First, females and 
males were equally likely to be engaged in 
agriculture, and the impact of the program is 
about the same for both genders. Second, prior agricultural experience had a relatively weak effect on participa-
tion in agriculture after the program, and program participants with prior agricultural experience show fairly simi-
































Figure 3: Impacts on agricultural attitudes and activity 
Program impact as a % of the control group average 
A program participant processes rubber in Salala, Bong County 
 
11 
B. Shift from illicit to legal livelihoods 
The program not only aimed to increase agricultural activity and productivity, but also steer high-risk youth away 
from more illicit livelihoods, such as unlicensed or illegal mining, logging, rubber-tapping, and hunting. Our survey 
suggests that engagement in illicit activities declines slightly for both treatment and control groups, with little dif-
ference in participation rates between those that participated in the program and those that did not. (While over-
all illicit activities decline slightly, the incidence of mining increases in both the treatment and control groups by 
similar amounts.) Nevertheless, participation levels fall among the treatment group, as agricultural hours seem to 
substitute somewhat for hours spent in illicit activities. 
 
First, to see what opportunities were available to these high risk youth in the absence of the program, we compare 
employment activities at baseline to those of the control group nearly two years later (and roughly 15 months af-
ter beneficiaries completed the program), in Figure 4a. We see that 42% of control group members are engaged in 
potentially illicit activities, versus 44% at baseline—a minor and not statistically significant fall. 
 
The fall conceals a significant change in the mix, however. Logging, rubber-tapping, and hunting have all become 
much less common. Mining, however, has increased from 14% of respondents to 22% of the control group. While 
some of this increase may represent legal mining activities, for prospectors with licenses, we suspect the majority 
is unlicensed (we do not have data on whether or not the operation is licensed, typically because the respondent—
a laborer in the surface mining rather than the owner or miner—did not know the licensed status of the operator). 
Gold prices rose throughout the period between the two surveys, attracting more young men in these areas to 




We compare post-program employment activities in the treatment group to the control group in Figure 4b. We 
start by looking at any participation in these activities. Those who passed through the program are more likely to 
engage in agriculture, as we have seen above. They are also more likely to be engaged in casual labor. 
 
We see little change, however, in participation in illicit activities. Participation in mining goes up in both the treat-
ment and control group, by similar magnitudes. 21% of the treated engage in mining, compared to 22% of con-
trols. Logging, rubber tapping, and hunting decline since baseline, as in controls, but in similar magnitudes. Overall 
we see a small (three percentage point) but not statistically significant decrease in participation in potentially illicit 
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potential 
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At least one 
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Figure 4a: Proportion of respondents who did "____" 
(More than one activity per respondent in most cases) 





As an alternative to rates of engagement, we can examine the number of hours employed. While participation 
rates in illicit activities decline, participation levels could fall if time spent in agriculture crowds out time in other 
activities. 
 
Figure 4c illustrates the effect of treatment on hours employed in each activity, relative to the control group. We 
see some evidence of crowding out, and a shift in hours from illicit activities to agriculture. The average person in 
the sample works 30 to 40 hours a week (with a mean of 36 hours of income-generating employment, and 52 
hours of all activities, including chores). We see a 26% increase in agricultural hours, little change in casual work 
and petty trading, a slight (16%) increase in hunting time, but steep average falls in other illicit activities: a 40% 
average decline in logging hours, a 21% decline in mining hours, and a 50% decline in tapping hours compared to 
the control group. These declines are not statistically significant, and the confidence interval includes anything 
from no change to very steep declines (nearly a 100% elimination of the activity, in some cases). We can’t say con-
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Figure 4b: Proportion of respondents who did "____" 
(More than one activity per respondent in most cases) 











Figure 4c: Impacts on hours worked in past month 
Program impact as a % of the control group average 
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Though hours may reduce, program beneficiaries seem to keep at 
least one foot in illicit activities. There are several possible expla-
nations for the persistent rates of illicit employment.  One is that 
agricultural incomes are risky, and beneficiaries mitigate that risk 
by keeping active in other areas—essentially, diversifying their 
portfolio of income and optimizing expected returns. We com-
monly see such diversification in agricultural households the 
world round.  
 
Another is that the rise in gold prices since baseline is simply too 
alluring for any employment program to prevent. Another possi-
bility is that respondents are not necessarily fully employed. 
Hence an increase in agricultural hours and activity does not nec-
essarily fully crowd out other opportunities, including illicit ones. 
C. Impacts on employment levels, income and wealth 
The LMA program aimed to develop not only legal livelihoods, but sustainable and, ideally, lucrative ones. Fifteen 
months is too short a time to judge the long term impact of the program on income and wealth, but it can give us 
medium-term impacts after two or three seasons. 
 
We see a sizable increase in average wealth from the program, especially in household durable assets, but no 
change in current income (measured for last week and last month), savings or spending for the average program 
participant. The top earners in the treatment group, however, do show more statistically significant higher earn-
ings than the top earners in the control group, although the effect is not large. 
 
There are several possible interpretations of this evidence, but the one that seems especially plausible is the fol-
lowing: 
 Agricultural income is quite volatile: it comes for some farmers but not all, and when it comes, it arrives in 
lumps rather than smoothly. Thus it is not unusual to see more significant impacts on current income in a 
minority. These may have been the minority who had sold crops shortly before the survey. 
 Asset wealth is less volatile than income. The fact that we see a sizable increase in household assets sug-
gests that agricultural profits from past seasons have been higher among program participants than con-
trols, and that these profits have been invested mainly in durable goods that either improve quality of life 
or act as a non-cash form of savings.  
 The fact that we see reasonable profits in a minority, low average profits, little change in spending, but a 
moderate and broad-based increase in wealth suggests that many farmers experience spikes in profitabili-
ty, probably when crops are sold (and especially when yields are high). Averaged over the year, incomes 
increase but not dramatically. 
 
When we consider this evidence with that of the previous section, especially a general enthusiasm for agriculture 
and its prospects, it appears that the program has been successful in creating sustainable agricultural livelihoods 
with modest increases in wealth. Agricultural hours and employment level may also rise over time. But in the me-
dium term, commercial cropping has not been sufficiently profitable to raise spending levels or shift youth out of 
illicit activities. 
Measuring income, wealth and poverty reduction 
We focus on four main measures of economic well-being. First we attempt to measure current income: net cash 
earnings from wages, business and farm profits in the four weeks prior to the survey. Since cash income, especially 
agricultural income, is highly variable over time, we also look at a less variable measure of poverty, the total of 
Miners display their gold in Bong County. 
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common types of short-term expenditures.
8
 This amount tends to be more stable than cash income, and is the 
most commonly used poverty measure internationally. Third, we look at current savings and debt levels. And final-
ly, we create an index of wealth by taking stock of housing quality, major assets and land possessed by the respon-
dent. In each case we try to look at average impacts as well as the distribution of economic well-being and impacts. 
The expenditures and wealth measures are generally the most reliable measures of any permanent impacts on 
economic well-being. 
 
Figure 5 provides summary statistics for the full sample (including all treatment and control subjects). To give a 
sense of earnings in the absence of the program, the median person in the control group reports about $50 in cash 
income in the past month. The average income is higher, about $106, because the average is pulled upwards by 
the small number of people who earned very large amounts in the past month (for instance, the control group 
member at the 90
th




Figures 6 and 7 display impacts of the program for the major variables. We do not see a large or statistically signifi-
cant change in incomes between program participants and controls in average current income, employment, level 
of spending on food and household items, or savings. The average income reported is about $3 per month greater 
among program participants (a 2% increase) but the change is sufficiently small that we cannot say for sure that 
the impact is not zero. If we exclude program participants who specialized in poultry-raising, the results are rela-
tively unchanged. We also see no significant difference in the aggregate number of hours worked at any activity in 
the past month. 
 
Income is volatile, and can be a noisy and unreliable measure of poverty. A person’s “consumption”—all the goods 
they use and own and consume—is typically considered a better measure of poverty than income, since it is more 
stable. People tend to smooth out income volatility and consume at more steady levels. 
 
We have two measures of consumption. One is a measure of recent expenditures on food and household items, 
and other short-term consumables. A second is a measure of durable assets, including housing quality, large as-
sets, and smaller but long-lasting household items. 
 
                                                                
8
 We actually measure expenditures at the household level and examine per capita expenditures here. We have yet to adjust 
this expenditures measure for the fact that children consume less, and so the results may change after this adjustment is pro-
grammed. 
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Income earned in the past 4 weeks 
Spending on food and household items in 
the past 7 days 
Hours worked in past 4 weeks 
Savings in the past 4 weeks 
Savings in the past 7 days 
Debt Stock  
Figure 5: Economic outcomes in full sample 
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Looking at our expenditures measure, the estimated impact is actually negative: program participants have 9% 
lower spending than the control group – they are spending slightly less on food and non-food and other household 
items than controls. Again the effect is relatively small, and is not statistically significantly different than zero. To-
gether the income and consumption effects suggest no major change in current income and poverty, at least at the 
15 month mark. 
 
Expenditures could be lower if program participants are saving or investing more of their earnings, perhaps be-
cause the program increased their future orientation or because they see higher returns from savings and invest-
ment. There is little difference in cash savings levels in the past month between treatment and control groups. 
Control group members saved roughly $26 in the past month compared to $25 by program participants. We do not 
have data on the total stock of savings, but we do have data on the most common measures of wealth—housing 
quality and asset stocks, discussed below, where we do see a modest increase. We also ask about borrowed sums. 
Debt levels are 7% higher among program participants, roughly $12 to the $11 reported by control group members 








We do have data on housing quality and assets – both agricultural tools and also a wide variety other household 
assets (including durables, like furniture or electronics, and smaller items like utensils and buckets. We create an 
index of these assets that ranges from 0 to 1. The index is 15% higher among program participants. Breaking it into 
its sub-components, we can see that housing quality increases little, agricultural assets increase more, and other 
household durables most of all. 
 
The increase in assets but not in current expenditures is unusual, but not inconsistent with general agricultural 
success. If people are forward looking, are concerned with reinvesting profits in the business or in durables that 
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Figure 6: Impacts on economic attitudes and activity 









Figure 7:Impacts on economic attitudes and activity 
Program impact as a % of the control group average 
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cash income, or do not trust themselves to manage cash well (and so pre-commit against wasteful spending by 
investing in durables). 
Distribution of impacts 
We can also look at the distribution of impacts on income and expenditures. We look at the difference between 
the treatment and control group at each percentile of the distribution – people in the bottom 10
th





, and so on, up to the 90
th
 percentile, in figures 8a and 8b. This effectively takes the person at the nth 
percentile in the distribution of the control group and compares their income or expenditures to the person at the 
same percentile in the treatment group. We calculate upper and lower bounds for each estimate. 
 
Looking at income, we can see the control mean income rising from about $5 at the 10
th
 percentile to about $52 at 
the median (50
th
 percentile) and above $240 at the 90
th
. The solid line gives the difference. This difference is close 
to zero up to the 40
th
 percentile and climbs to about $8 at the median—a 7% increase relative to the control group 





 percentiles. These are statistically significant differences, and reasonably large ones—increases of about 25% 




Since most income, especially agricultural income, is lumpy and risky, it’s not unusual to see a skewed impact – low 
average or median impacts but high impacts for a minority. Since we are measuring at a point in time, it is not clear 
whether the higher profits are experienced by many eventually, or if they are concentrated among a few. The fact 
that the wealth impact is more evenly distributed (see below) suggests that the profits are eventually shared by 
many. If shared, however, it means that those with high profits now experience low profits in most other months, 
meaning that average profits are quite low. 
 
Looking at the distribution of expenditure, meanwhile, we see that the difference between the treatment and con-















Figure 8a: Difference in net income at each percentile 





Finally, we look at the distribution of the wealth effect in Figure 8c. The upward shift we noted in the average 
treatment effect is not driven by a handful of highly successful beneficiaries with large increases in wealth. Rather, 
the wealth effect appears fairly broad based and consistent across the sample.  
 
This evidence weighs in favor of the idea that income is quite volatile and the impacts among a minority are a con-
sequence of the fact that income is measured at a point in time, missing the crop sales or other volatile sources of 
income, and that the returns from agriculture and the increase in cash cropping and sales is a slightly more broad-
based wealth effect.  
 
 
D. Citizenship and social integration 
The residential training experience, the life skills and psychosocial programming, the new livelihoods, and reinser-












Figure 8b: Difference in spending on food and household 
items at each percentile 



































Figure 8c: Difference in asset index at each percentile 
Diff. Lower bound Upper bound 
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most measures. While not all of the estimated impacts are large enough to be statistically significant, they never-
theless suggest a broad-based reduction in alienation and some gains in stability.  
 
Citizenship and social integration are difficult to capture, but we attempt to measure several aspects of positive 
social life, including an index of various types of community participation, an index of family relations, and index of 
social support received, and also measures of how settled the youth are in their communities: whether they have 
changed communities in the past 6 months and whether they are interested in staying in their current community. 




Figure 9 displays treatment effects relative to the control group mean. The index of community participation cap-
tures a range of different activities, including group memberships, leadership activities, participation in community 
meetings, and contributions to public goods. Participation among both the treatment and control groups was al-
ready extremely high, and so it might be difficult to achieve many gains in our measure. Indeed, we observe almost 
no difference between the treatment and control group 
 
The social support index measures the presence of people in the participant’s life who can comfort them when 
sad, offer advice, lend belongings, and so forth. We see a slight increase among program participants, of 6%, 
though this result is not statistically significant. Looking by gender, however, the improvement is 7% and significant 
for males, but negative and insignificant for females. 
 
We also look at family relations in particular. We 
develop an index based on questions about the 
frequency they see family members or attend 
meetings, the degree of concern their family 
shows for them, advising and support given, and 
disputes and troubles within the family. The level 
of this index increases a small amount, about 4%, 
overall. The improvement is larger and significant 
for women, who report a 9% increase on average. 
 
We also construct an index of peer group quality 
that falls to the extent that peers have “negative” 
characteristics (such as gambling, drug use, steal-
ing, etc.) and rises with “positive” characteristics 
(such as hard working, participate in community, 
provide advice, etc.). We see virtually no change 
between treatment and control individuals. 
 














Figure 9: Impacts on social integration 
Program impact as a % of the control group average 
A program participant with family, Bong County 
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Finally, we see some evidence of a slight increase in locational stability, although the results are not statistically 
significant. Program participants are 4% less likely to have changed communities in the past 6 months, and 9% 
more likely to say they would like to stay in their current community. 
 
Aggression and violence are also important indications of social integration, and we turn to them below. Before 
that, however, we also consider other psychosocial effects of the program relevant to social integration.  
E. Other psychosocial impacts  
Improving psychological well-being was not a formal objective of the program, and counselors were not trained 
mental health professionals. Even so, there are three reasons to investigate whether the program leads to im-
provements the psychosocial health of participants.  
1. More stable livelihoods and new skills have the potential to improve self-esteem and reduce depression. 
This link from poverty and uncertainty to mental health is uncertain and unproven, however, mainly for 
lack of rigorous evidence from victims (and perpetrators) of war trauma. This program and evaluation 
provides a unique opportunity for new evidence. 
2. A number of studies have shown a link between social support and mental health. Since this program 
aims to reintegrate individuals into society and improve social skills, we might expect to see increased 
links to family and community. In turn, we would expect to see an improvement in mental health.  
3. Dealing with war trauma and understanding the causes of violence (and one’s role in that violence) was 
also a theme of the psychosocial and life skills classes, and the curriculum included psycho-education on 
war trauma and post-traumatic stress disorder. While not mental health professionals, the psycho-
education and supportive counseling given by  trainers is similar to other psychosocial counselingcon-
ducted by other NGOs in Liberia, and its effectiveness is likely to be of interest. 
4. Finally, inside and outside the classroom, participants learned to regulate their emotions, communicate 
clearly, build sustainable relationships, and resolve interpersonal conflicts.  
 
As we noted above, our qualitative work suggests a substantial change in confidence and less aggressive and risky 
behavior, as well as a new framework for thinking about the past, especially the war. Looking at the quantitative 
data, measuring self-reported symptoms and severity, we see significant improvements in two areas of mental 
health: depression and emotional distress, and symptoms of post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). Both male and 
female program participants report a third fewer symptoms after the program. 
 
We also see improvements in mental health in the control group, however, especially among males. Males who did 
not participate in the program also showed almost identical improvement. Thus we can’t attribute the changes in 
male mental health to the program per se. It is possible that other factors—such as the passage of time since war 
and the normalization of life and continued peace across the country—helped males in the control group deal with 
their distress and trauma.  
 
We do, however, see marked improvements among female program participants in both depression/distress and 
PTSD symptoms. Exploring these unintended positive consequences are an important part of any post conflict pro-
gramming, especially when dealing with high-risk or vulnerable youth, and so we seek to explore these findings a 
little further. 
 
We focus on two main measures of mental health: self-reported symptoms of post-traumatic stress disorder 
(PTSD) and self-reported symptoms of depression and emotional distress. The PTSD scale includes symptoms such 
as nightmares, feeling jumpy, feeling detached, and avoiding things that are reminders of trauma. The depression 
scale includes standard symptoms such as feeling sad, fatigued, or having lack of appetite, as well as culturally-
specific manifestations and perceptions of depression and distress, such as having your ‘heart spoiled’ or your 




Figures 10 and 11 show the trend change in our two indices for men and women, both treatment and control. At 
baseline, males reported an average of 12 and females an average of 14 on a scale of 39.  At baseline, treatment 





The trend change among males looks similar for both treatment and control groups. Both fall from roughly a score 
of 12 to 8 on the PTSD scale and from roughly 14 to 19 on the depression/distress scale—an improvement of about 
one third in both indices. In fact, after controlling for differences in the treatment and control group composition, 
male program participants actually report a 6% greater reduction in PTSD symptoms and a 3% greater reduction in 
depression/distress symptoms relative to the controls, but these differences are small and statistically insignifi-
cant. 
 
Women, however, report significant improvements. We observe a very different trend change among treatment 
women compared to controls in the figures above. Relative to the control group, women report 30% fewer symp-




























We continue to investigate the symptoms and process of recovery using the qualitative analysis. While there was a 
range of symptoms in both genders, females reported higher symptoms on average, which is similar to global 
trends.   
The findings among males echo a large literature on resilience to trauma: in populations with high levels of expo-
sure to violence, a large number of people experience some symptoms of PTSD or depression. However, the ma-
jority heals over time without psychological intervention and only a minority need specialized services.  In this pro-
gram, female participants reported higher levels of symptoms at the beginning of the program and may have 
needed more help addressing those symptoms than males.  Outside of the program, females may continue to be 
exposed to situations or violence that may contribute to the persistence of symptoms.  The program may there-
fore better target their distress and trauma..  
F. Aggression and potential for mobilization into violence 
Finally, there are at least two reasons to expect the program could reduce the potential for violence. First, reloca-
tion to the training center (and, ultimately, a new village) can replace previous ties to ex-combatants and former 
commanders with counselors, other motivated students, and farmers. The goal is to help participants adopt a new 
set of norms, reference groups, and networks, and encourage a process of socialization from ‘combatant’ into 
community life.  
 
The second rationale is economic: to give ex-combatants and war-affected youth alternatives to their current illicit 
activities or low-return alternatives, and thus dissuade them from future violence. While we do not see increases 
in current income or spending on food and household items, we do see a significant rise in assets, suggesting that 
the program is likely leading to long term changes in wealth, especially durable and fixed wealth. Also, engagement 
in agriculture is high. Thus we might expect the expectation of future returns to mitigate violence. 
 
We examine a set of measures of criminal and aggressive attitudes and behaviors, as well as a variety of proxies for 
risk of mobilization into armed rebellion in the future. Our discussion focuses mainly on males. 
Interpersonal aggression and potential for crime 
The evidence on aggression and crime is ambiguous, and does not suggest a significant change in the behavior of 
program participants. Looking at interpersonal aggression and crime, we see that by some measures program par-


































the impacts are not statistically significant. This remains true even when we restrict our analysis to those men who, 




Figure 12 reports treatment effects on our key measures. First, we asked respondents about their attitudes to vio-
lent solutions to problems, 11 in all, such as the appropriateness of trial by ordeal for suspected witches or crimi-
nals, storekeepers chasing and killing thieves, or corrupt leaders being beaten. Male program participants are 8% 
less likely to report support for violent solutions, though the impact is not statistically significant. 
 
Second, we ask respondents about their own hostile behaviors, 11 in all, such as cursing, threatening others, hav-
ing uncontrollable anger, etc.. We see little effect of treatment: male program participants report 7% higher levels 
of hostile behaviors, though again the impact is not statistically significant. 
 
Third, we ask about the total number of fights and angry disputes they have had in the past six months, as well as 
the total number of confrontations with leaders and police in the past six months. The average number of fights in 
the control group in the past six months is small, at 0.8, implying that the average person had at most one fight. 
Males report 10% fewer fights and 35% fewer confrontations with leaders, though in each case large positive and 
negative changes are within the confidence interval. 
 
Fourth, we ask whether they were arrested or jailed in the past six months, whether they admit to involvement in 
any crime (including drug selling, theft (minor or major), robbery, or pickpocketing), and whether they owned a 
firearm. Overall, 8% of all respondents reported being jailed, 8% reported involvement in crime, and 10% reported 
owning a firearm (typically a hunting rifle).  
 
Relative to these average levels, male program participants were 1% less likely to report being arrested but 20% 
more likely to report that they were involved in a crime. They were 8% more likely to own a firearm. Again, these 
results are not statistically significant. 
 
It is possible that these small average results conceal large variation in impacts, especially improvements among 
the most violent. After all, those that began the program as non-aggressive persons have little room for improve-
ment. In results not displayed here, we also look whether men with the most potential for instability and aggres-
sion are more likely to reduce aggression through the program. We use baseline measures of hostile behaviors, 
war experiences, and attitudes to violence to identify those with the most propensities. While this pre-program 
propensity for violence is strongly predictive of post-program aggression overall, we see little evidence that the 
“worst” cases improved more as a result of treatment. The correlations are in the expected direction, but the re-
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Figure 12: Impacts on aggression (males only) 
Program impact as a % of the control group average 
 
23 
less aggressive men do not see any treatment effect on arrests, but the more aggressive are less likely to be ar-
rested when they are treated. 
Mobilization into violence and potential for re-recruitment 
We also look at measures than may indicate ease of mobilization into insurrection or crime. In particular, the sur-
vey data collection coincided with the breakout of election violence in Cote d’Ivoire, and we looked closely at res-
pondents’ interest in the conflict and closeness to recruitment activities. 
 
Here we see some strongly suggestive evidence that program participants are less likely to be re-recruited into 
warfare. Partly because of the rarity of such behaviors they are difficult to identify precisely, and so they are not 
statistically significant. Nevertheless, the direction and magnitude of the average impacts are much more consis-
tent in their direction, and much larger, than with interpersonal aggression. The reduction of interest in the vi-
olence in Cote d’Ivoire was quite marked.  
 
Our interpretation is that aggressive responses to the program are highly heterogeneous—many who participated 
succeeded and so reduce their interest in armed insurrection. But because these traits are difficult to measure, and 
because not all respond to treatment in this way, the average impacts are large but not statistically precise. Given 




We report treatment effects in Figure 13. Male program participants are 7% less likely to report close relationships 
with former commanders (based on an index for counting commanders as close peers, for other close relations 
with a commander, for receiving jobs from commanders, or currently reporting to a commander), but 10% more 
likely to associate with other ex-combatants as their close peers. The pattern is relatively intuitive: participation in 
the program weakens commander ties somewhat, but strengthens peers relationships with other ex-combatants, 
probably because of the shared experience in the program. (Given the marked decrease in war-like forms of ag-
gression (discussed next) we do not regard the increase in relations with ex-combatants as particularly concerning. 
Rather, it is a mechanical function of the program and does not seem to carry risks.) 
 
For instance, male program participants are also 5% less likely to call themselves by a “war name”, which may be 
an indicator of identification with a faction or their former lives. Since abandoning a war name was a theme in the 
psychosocial counseling, it is good to see these impacts persisting, although the impact is not statistically signifi-
cant. 
 
We also construct an index of six general attitudes on willingness to fight in a hypothetical conflict (such as, with-























Figure 13: Impacts on potential for mobilization into violence (males only) 
Program impact as a % of the control group average 
 
24 
bush” if asked, willingness to attend secret meetings, and knowledge of how to get weapons). This index is 14% 
lower among program participants. 
 
Additionally, we construct an index of attitudes towards democracy, including attitudes towards military coups, 
autocrats, the elimination of term limits, and so forth. We see little difference between treatment and control 
males. 
 
Finally, the post-election violence in Cote d’Ivoire was rising in intensity during the main survey months, February 
through April 2011. We added questions to the survey to measure the risk of mobilization into Cote d’Ivoire vi-
olence, and created a composite of 11 questions. For the 10% of respondents we could not find, we also made 
discreet inquiries in their communities and among friends as to whether they could not be found because they had 
gone to fight.  
 
None of our sample—treatment or control—appear to have actually gone to Cote d’Ivoire. But we observe a large 
decrease in interest in the violence and exposure to opportunities among program participants—a fall of 35%. Un-
fortunately the result is not statistically significant. One reason (as we see below) is the relative rarity of interest in 
the Cote d’Ivoire violence – this makes our threshold for statistical significance that much more difficult to cross. 
Nevertheless, this is an exceptionally difficult measure to estimate, and we take the coefficient as fairly strongly 
suggestive evidence that war held less appeal for beneficiaries of the program. 
 
More detail here may be of interest. Newspaper reports and our informal field investigations suggest that Liberians 
were being recruited as mercenaries through former generals. These generals received money from both sides of 
the conflict to attract young men to fight. Our investigations suggest that most of the active recruitment was tak-
ing place in the capital and in large towns like Ganta, not the rural areas where most of our sample resides. We 
heard accounts of recruits being offered $100 to $200 to transport themselves to Cote d’Ivoire, with promises of 
more money upon arrival. Recruitment levels were modest, however. Our best guess is that no more than one or 
two thousand were recruited in this way. Nevertheless, there was considerable potential for the war to escalate 
and potential recruits watched with great interest.  
 
In our experience, people spoke relatively freely about their interest in the conflict, and from the survey we have 
11 indicators of whether respondents: were asked to attend a secret meeting about Cote d’Ivoire (4%); attended 
such a meeting (3%); have talked to people about going (8%); know people who have gone to Cote d’Ivoire (9%); 
know people who were promised money to go (5%); would move towards Cote d’Ivoire if war broke out (9%); 
would go if called to fight for a particular tribe (3%); would go to Cote d’Ivoire if offered $500 (2%); were promised 
money to go to Cote d’Ivoire (3%); are willing to fight if war breaks out (3%); and, have plans to go to Cote d’Ivoire 










Figures 14a and 14b display responses and Figure 15 displays treatment effects relative to the control group mean 
for each of these measures. We see sizable improvements in several of these individual indicators, but like the ag-
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As with interpersonal aggression and crime, we might expect that higher initial propensity for aggression and in-
stability would affect the response to the program. In fact, while higher initial propensity for instability is a strong 
predictor of ease of mobilization overall, there does not appear to be any different effect of treatment on those 
with high versus low propensities at the outset. 
7. Comparative analysis of impacts  
There is little rigorous evidence of the impact of agriculture, training, or economic programs on aggression and 
peacebuilding. The LMA program, which targets high-risk youth, unfortunately has no close comparisons, especial-
ly given the poor track record of demobilization and reintegration programs worldwide. Evaluations of youth em-
ployment and anti-poverty programs, however, are more common, and it may be useful to compare these results 
to the impacts observed in other developing country employment programs. Since income and employment is one 
of the major channels by which we think peace is encouraged, and young men are dissuaded from re-recruitment, 
a focus on these impacts, and what it implies for future economic programming, is worthwhile. 
A. Evidence from demobilization programs 
The LMA program under study has few comparisons. Most national demobilization and reintegration programs are 
more modest in size, less comprehensive in their service delivery, and take place in the immediate aftermath of 
conflict while economies are still in flux. Not surprisingly, evaluations of these programs have shown mixed results 




By comparison to the majority of demobilization programs, the LMA program is unambiguously among the most 
successful of its kind, in part because of the intensity of the approach, the comprehensiveness of the program, and 
the focus on especially hard cases. 
 
The lesson for other demobilization programs is that targeting of high-risk cases and provision of comprehensive 
support to cool hot spots may be a useful complement to a broad-based demobilization and reintegration pro-
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27 
gram, especially after the initial stages of demobilization are complete and the majority of ex-combatants have 
reintegrated to some extent.  
B. Evidence from related economic programs outside Liberia 
The program focuses on providing agricultural skills and start-up tools to encourage a transition from illicit livelih-
oods to farming and animal husbandry. We are not aware of similar programs for high-risk populations, let alone 
hard evidence on their success or failure. Other evaluated programs have targeted rural “ultra-poor”, or urban 
high-risk populations, but typically focus on non-farm microenterprise employment (like vending items, setting up 
shops and kiosks, vocations, or handicraft production). Agricultural assistance programs can show high returns but 
they typically target more established farmers. The results from this study suggest, however, that expanding the 
size, productivity and profitability of relatively non-established farmers into the activity is quite difficult, especially 
in an environment such as Liberia.  
 
While evidence on agricultural interventions is limited, there is a broader base of evidence on programs that focus 
on providing business skills and capital for small income generating activities and microenterprises, including agri-
cultural enterprises such as animal raising or trading (i.e. at other points in the agriculture value chain). We sum-
marize some of the evidence on these interventions, including evidence from a growing number of randomized 
trials of the very poor, excluded and (in some cases) high risk youth. 
 
Rigorous evaluations of employment and income generation programs in Africa, South Asia and elsewhere have 
shown promising results. First, poor people appear to have opportunities to earn high returns to capital, but with 
limited assets or the ability to borrow, they have difficulty achieving them.
10
 Programs that have provided capital— 
either in-kind assets, credit or cash—to poor individuals have observed annual returns on those investments of 30 
to 60%, and sometimes higher. These groups range from farmers in Ghana, to ultra-poor women and men in rural 
areas, to small entrepreneurs in Sri Lanka, to unskilled youths in northern Uganda, often with grants of $200 to 
$400.
11
 These returns have a large variance, in part because entrepreneurship is by its nature quite risky, but also 
because people have different capacities as entrepreneurs. In general, we see that high ability, more patient, less 
risk-averse, and more capital-constrained people perform better when given access to capital and basic business 
skills training. 
 
The evidence on pure skills training programs is more mixed. Job retraining programs in the US and Europe have 
the largest amount of evidence—hundreds of evaluations in all—and the general conclusion is that most of these 
programs do not have significant impacts, and almost none pass a cost-benefit test.
12
 The relevance of such studies 
for developing countries is probably quite limited, however, as they take place in very different skills and sectors 
and populations. 
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Skills training programs in developing countries show more promise. Not all skills. Pure business skills training pro-
grams, without any access to capital, generally show positive but small impacts.
13
 There is some evidence that vo-
cational skills training and some agricultural extension programs provide more sizable returns, especially in the 
poorest countries. In general, however, the balance of evidence suggests that the returns to skills are lower than 
the returns to capital, suggesting that credit and capital may be the scarcer resource and the most binding con-




Little of this evidence, however, speaks to potentially high risk individuals, such as ex-combatants who remain in 
loose armed group structures or engaged in illicit activities. This is a large and crucial group of (mostly) men, who 
may not respond quite so well to simple cash or capital transfers, by virtue of being less established, poorer, having 
fewer initial skills, or psychological trauma or social dislocation that constrains their potential. 
 
Nevertheless, a handful of studies of other war-affected populations suggest that micro-entrepreneurship, with a 
focus on business skills training and grants, has the potential to yield high returns. Some of these enterprises are 
explicitly agricultural, though they usually involve activities elsewhere in the agricultural value chain, such as 
transporting goods or bringing goods from distant markets to sell in smaller local markets where goods are scarcer.  
 
For example, in northern Uganda, a program with ultra-poor and war-affected households, especially women, yield 
evidence of returns of 30% or more to basic business skills training and cash grants of approximately $150.
15
 Out of 
concern that cash grants would be wasted, or at least not invested in productive enterprise, the NGO provided 
extensive monitoring and follow-up. Perhaps because of this extensive monitoring, the vast bulk of the grants were 
invested in business. This monitoring, however, proved extremely expensive, and probably does not pass a simple 
cost-benefit test. The researchers are presently working with the NGO to test the impact and cost-effectiveness of 
this follow-up, looking at how cash is spent by beneficiaries with and without the extensive follow-up. 
 
Another grants program in Uganda, with both war-affected and non-war affected young men and women, also 
appears to yield average returns of 20% to 35% on grants of roughly $400.
16
 These grants were provided to youth 
with the proviso that they would be used for vocational skills training and start-up expenses in villages and small 
towns. There was little or no monitoring or follow-up after disbursement, however. Rather, youth were formed 
into groups and made decisions on spending together. The majority of the grants were used for business purposes. 
Unfortunately, it’s not possible to say whether the group dimension was what contributed to good use of the 
grant, and more follow-up and advising may have raised average returns. But the design was inexpensive to im-
plement and so is more likely to pass a cost-benefit test. 
 
Finally, pilot results from a study of cash grants to 100 urban street youth in Liberia (including a majority of ex-
combatants and other high risk youth) suggest that cash grants and a psychosocial intervention were effective at 
promoting investment in business enterprises, raising incomes, and reducing risky and illegal behaviors. Within 
two months of the intervention, drug sales and petty crime were estimated to halve. More time will be required to 
determine the lasting effects of cash grants, and the long term impacts on income, and so these results should be 
taken with caution. A scaled up intervention and evaluation are underway. They do indicate, however, that high-
risk populations may be capable of making legal and forward-looking investments with unconditional cash trans-
fers. 
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29 
Indeed, a growing base of evidence stresses the high impact of cash transfers to the poor, especially relative to the 
cost of implementation. Two recent research reports commissioned by DFID summarize the evidence on condi-
tional and unconditional transfers in poor countries worldwide, and argue that such programs are impactful, fair 
and assured—more so than many of the alternative aid strategies.
17
 We feel the evidence base remains too thin 
for such a strong conclusion. Nevertheless, the evidence favors (i) more emphasis on capital and asset building, 
possibly through cash transfers or increased availability of finance; and (ii) close evaluation of the impact of cash or 
capital injections, especially in comparison to skills training. 
C. Interpreting our findings in light of this evidence 
A core objective of the program is to provide legal, sustainable and lucrative employment alternatives to high-risk 
youth, and steer them away from illicit activities. To do so most successfully, these legal alternatives must be la-
bor-intensive, provide opportunities for full-time work, and have high revenue-generating potential. 
 
We observe significant impacts on wealth but no impact on current income, spending on food and household 
items, and poverty. In comparison to the impacts identified in non-farm employment programs discussed above—
typically 30 to 60% annual returns on the skills training and capital components combined—the economic returns 
to the agricultural training and reintegration appear to be in the lower end of this range. There are several possible 
reasons: 
 
1) Population. The target population may be particularly difficult. We have observed higher levels of perfor-
mance in ultra-poor populations, including war-affected populations, but these were generally not high-risk 
youth. It is possible that their social and economic situation limited their potential to perform. There are a few 
pieces of evidence that weigh against this interpretation, however. Looking at our sample, the program is not 
more effective for participants with more wealth, more ability, or more social stability. Also, preliminary re-
sults from another IPA evaluation of a non-farm employment show reasonable returns with a group of urban 
youth in Liberia. 
 
2) Gestation time. It may take more time for new farmers, risky populations or not, to build a successful agricul-
tural livelihood, perhaps several seasons. Farm employment may have a longer gestation period than non-
farm business. Unfortunately, we do not have the data to say. Nor do we have data on future expected eco-
nomic returns. Nevertheless, the fact that many program participants continue to attempt agriculture and ex-
press interest in agriculture in future suggests that they see at least some future in the activity. In principle, 
the expectation of future returns could have just as powerful an impact on economic and social reintegration 
as immediate returns, as the hope of future returns deters dangerous or risky behaviors today. 
 
3) Risk. From our qualitative interviews, there was no shortage of graduates who saw their seeds fail to germi-
nate, their crops bring little at market, or other hardships. This will lead to high short term variation in success 
and lower average returns. Eventually a subset of program participants with a continued string of successes 
may show significant improvements. Again, however, this may take more than a few seasons to reveal itself. 
 
4) Market access. While the program appears to have successfully oriented youth towards agriculture and re-
lieved important constraints—namely skills and start-up materials—it may be that other constraints limit their 
success, at least in the short term. Most report that land is abundantly available to them, in the control group 
and treatment group, so what might these other constraints be? One is poor market development and access, 
especially in remoter areas. Another is high transportation and transaction costs, which limit access to what 
markets exist.  
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5) Insufficient training. Agricultural productivity and profits would almost certainly be greater if the training itself 
were more intensive, or included an agricultural extension component after the program. If trainees also act 
as informal agricultural trainers and extension agents to kin or community members at home, this knowledge 
could spill over into the community. We unfortunately do not have measures of these positive spillovers.  
 
Nevertheless, in most economic activities, additional inputs into production show diminishing returns—that is, 
more inputs mechanically lead to more outputs, but everything else equal, more of the same input has less 
and less of an impact on output. Given the broadening base of evidence on the general scarcity of capital in 
Africa, and the relatively high returns to capital (discussed above), we suspect that the marginal dollar would 
have higher impact if invested in capital rather than skills. We elaborate below. This is a conjecture rather than 
proof, however, and remains an important area for experimentation and evaluation in youth employment 
programs. 
 
6) Capital constraints. In addition to the general literature reviewed above, some of the variation in success 
points to the importance of capital. Program participants and control group members with more initial assets 
and access to credit generally engaged in more agriculture and earned higher profits. Moreover, of the pro-
gram participants, it is those with the least initial wealth and access to credit who seem to have made the 
largest improvements in agricultural activities and income. These results suggest that future programs may in-
crease success by increasing the amount of capital—in kind or cash—available to program participants. This is 
particularly true in light of the high risk of agriculture—those constrained in capital and credit will find it diffi-
cult to recover from a single seed or crop failure and continue farming. 
 
How would trainees invest capital? We asked respondents how they would invest a gift or transfer of $100 
from a kin member. (We use “kin member” so as not to create expectations of a grant from IPA or LMA.) Res-
ponses are in Figure 16. 9% or fewer say they would mainly consume the money, with little treatment-control 
difference. 73% of controls and 63% of program participants say they would invest in a new or existing busi-




Answers to hypothetical questions must be taken with caution. The results suggest that treatment has increased 
interest in agriculture and expectations of future returns. Nevertheless, agriculture is a minority choice even for 
program participants. One reason may be that, when engaged in risky activities, the optimal use of new capital is 
to invest in another income stream with a low correlation of risk. Thus, when one income stream fails, there is still 
a chance of income from another source. Our qualitative research—and indeed a broad base of development re-
search—suggests that this may be especially true with agriculture since income rises and falls depending on the 
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even after heavy investments in skills and training. All of the reasons above—poor market access, high risk, and 
length of time to reach returns—may make agriculture a less attractive option for this group. 
8. Recommendations and implications for the reintegration of high-
risk youth  
This section addresses government, civil society and international organization reintegration plans and efforts in 
general. Based on our analysis of program impacts and our assessment of other youth employment programs, we 
suggest a number of possible future adjustments and programs to explore. None of these solutions are as yet 
proven, and so we also encourage experimentation and, where possible, evaluation of what works and what does 
not. 
A. Immediate versus longer term reintegration programming 
When considering recommendations from this evaluation, it is crucial to understand the context in which the pro-
gram will be implemented. This evaluation took place approximately six years after war ended in Liberia. While the 
program participants came from potential hot spots, the country as a whole was becoming increasingly stable. In 
this phase of post-conflict reconstruction, the purpose of such a reintegration program is to promote the prevailing 
stability and contribute to enduring peace by reducing the risk of future conflict. This should be distinguished from 
reintegration programs that launch in the immediate post-conflict period.  
 
When a conflict first comes to an end, there is often an active threat of a return to violence, chains of command 
among ex-combatants are still intact and influential, war trauma is acute, and norms of war dominate. In these 
cases, the goal of such a program is to help individuals transition from wartime to peace, making the residential 
and psychosocial components particularly important. Liberia’s own national reintegration program demonstrated 
that in order to take advantage of skills training, ex-combatants need more than just courses and toolkits when 
conflict first ends. This program’s unique approach of combining psychosocial and life skills education with practic-
al skills training in a residential environment seems necessary to transition people from fighters to productive 
members of a peaceful society. 
 
There are good arguments to continue highly intensive programs targeted at hot spots, especially if these target 
areas where the government wishes to regain control over resources and concessions, or where active recruitment 
may take place for conflict in neighboring countries—as recent events in Guinea and Cote d’Ivoire make abundant-
ly clear. To be effective, these highly targeted interventions may have to be as timely and as speedy as the compet-
ing opportunities. Hence the government or UN or NGOs may want to consider strategic reserves of funds for such 
counter-recruitment or concession reclamation efforts, along with systems that can move into place quickly. 
 
Is a comprehensive model of intensive training and capital otherwise required? There is a trade-off involved. On 
the one hand, Liberia sorely lacks high-skill labor in any industry, including agriculture. Intensive training programs 
can help build a more highly skilled labor force and help the growth of industry and agri-business. On the other 
hand, when resources are scarce, a smaller and less intensive program for more people can more equitably and 
efficiently spread the benefits. If, after some level, there are diminishing returns to added investments in the same 
person, splitting that assistance between two persons can result in higher aggregate gains. 
 
The goal of this report is not to conclude that one direction is better than the other, but merely to highlight the 
trade-off itself. Our other research and review of the literature incline us towards the more broad-based approach, 
but the answer will depend on the specific policy aims of any given project. For instance, when it comes to achiev-
ing the Poverty Reduction Strategy, and especially when targeting high-risk youth (outside hot spots) or the ultra-
poor, we also favor less intensive approaches because here our aims are inherently broad based (i.e. minimize po-
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verty) and because it seems unlikely that the ultra-poor or the high-risk youth are the population most likely to 
develop into a high-skilled workforce. Intensive training and high-skill programs are undoubtedly crucial to growth 
and poverty reduction in Liberia, but perhaps amongst a different population. 
B. Capital versus skills investment in agricultural programming 
Above we focus on the trade-off between heavy investments in a smaller number of individuals versus smaller 
investments in more. But given a per person level of resources, every employment program must encounters 
trade-offs to investments in skills versus capital. Both of each is clearly better for beneficiaries, and will improve 
their performance and private returns. But for a fixed cost per beneficiary, more of one means less of the other.  
 
The evidence discussed above that the private returns to capital (goods, assets or cash) tend to be higher than the 
private returns to skills, at least in non-farm enterprises. It is unproven whether this is the case for agriculture, but 
several pieces of evidence suggest this may be the case. First, returns to capital in agriculture seem to be quite 
high, at least among established farmers. And second, capital seems to have been a strongly binding constraint 
among the beneficiaries of this program. 
 
This capital could come in several forms: 
 
 As part of capital assistance, programs could consider conditional cash transfers, designed in such a way as to 
mitigate wastage and potential self-control problems.
18
 Group-level monitoring, or multiple disbursements 
conditional on past performance, could be cost-effective means of minimizing wastage, at least when benefi-
ciaries are not too thinly spread. 
 
 Provide informal insurance to graduates, such that in the event that seeds fail to germinate, tools break, or the 
first crop is a failure, more assistance can be provided. To mitigate the risk that graduates work less hard, or 
attempt to defraud the system, simple community or group monitoring systems could verify the graduate’s ef-





 Facilitate access to credit, by linking graduates to village-level microfinance organizations or rotating savings 
and credit organizations, or instructing graduates on how to form their own rotating savings and credit associ-
ations.  
o While access to “susus” is very broad, the interest rate paid on savings is actually negative (meaning 
people pay large sums to save), time horizons for both savings and borrowing are very short (typically 
less than a few months, which is seldom time to accumulate a large savings amount or borrow and 
repay a loan for investment purposes), and interest rates on loans are high—reaching or exceeding 
10% interest per month, or 200% annual rates of interest. 
 
Once they have returned to their communities, graduates face a large number of challenges. It may be that they 
would also benefit from increased follow-up or access to agricultural extension. The more remote these graduates, 
the less cost-effective any such extension services are likely to be. But residential training is also costly. It is worth 
exploring cost-effective models of delivering advice and instruction both before and after graduates’ independent 
attempts to start-up a farm. 
 
                                                                
18
 We should note, however, that not all non-business forms of spending are necessarily wastage; economic theory suggests 
that cash windfalls are optimally allocated not only to future-based investment but also payment of debts, current consump-
tion, and savings, and so some room for alternative expenditures is recommended. 
19
 See, for example, Clarke Daniel and Stefan Dercon, "Insurance, Credit and Safety Nets for the Poor in a World of Risk," 
(United Nations, Department of Economics and Social Affairs, 2009). 
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Both of the above strategies come at a cost. To contain costs, it may make sense to shift the mix of skills training 
and capital towards more capital-intensive assistance. For instance, a program of shorter courses with more capital 
and (possibly) more extension services. This might be a more effective mix given our (cautious) evidence that the 
returns to capital are greater than the returns to skills. Moreover, given the fixed cost of rebuilding training sites 
and space constraints within each site, this shift could increase the capacity of the program to take on more classes 
of more students. 
 This ignores, of course, the psychosocial and life skills component of the program. Shorter training periods 
may not be enough time to adjust norms, reintegrate socially, learn to manage conflict, and so forth. 
While qualitatively we saw this to be very important during the program, we also see that improvements 
in social participation, aggression, and psychological well-being were shared by the control group. Hence 
it is not clear that longer trainings are needed for psychosocial purposes except perhaps with populations 
that could not have accessed this stability or gains outside the program. High-risk women may be an ex-
ample, as well as extremely high risk populations (like the Guthrie plantation occupants that attended 
previous phases of the program. 
 
Training need not be limited to agricultural production. There is money to be made at every step of the agricultural 
value chain, and successful farmers also understand the importance of input markets and the sales channel. Pro-
gram participants may benefit from more training on the marketing aspects of agriculture, market information, 
and business skills training, illustrating other areas of the agricultural value chain. 
 
Finally, access to markets may have been an important constraint on success. Our research does not speak directly 
to this question, however, and more investigation on this point will be needed. But perhaps any training compo-
nent of the program should stress to trainees the need for proximity to markets, and encourage graduates to settle 
closer to major markets both for inputs and produce. 
 
Linking graduates to producers could provide this market linkage directly. This could include out-grower schemes 
or placement in commercial farms or plantations. 
C. Alternative youth employment program options 
The evidence from non-farm employment programs discussed above suggest that village- town- and city-based 
microenterprises are also viable economic alternatives for youth, one that can the evidence suggests can yield high 
potential economic returns, modest social returns, and the potential to reduce crime and aggression among unst-
able populations. We will address the potential for these non-farm alternatives, including design alternatives, in a 
future policy memo. 
 
One could imagine, however, a reintegration program that offers the target population the choice between non-
farm microenterprise assistance and agricultural training and start-up. It would allow NGOs to expand the range of 
services they deliver to their target population, and may produce higher average results. At present, many youth 
may opt to enter the agricultural livelihoods program in spite of a low aptitude or interest in farming as a profes-
sion (relative to the alternatives). They do so because the absence of alternatives.  
 
In fact, at the outset of the program, participants expressed a great deal of interest in agricultural skills. This re-
sponse, however, was after having been briefed about the nature of the program. We suspect that agricultural 
skills are highly valued, and valuable. But as we have seen, even dedicated farmers wisely invest in alternative en-
terprises. (The interest in using a $100 gift to invest in a new or existing business speaks to interest in such alterna-
tives.) Also, not all youth necessarily have the aptitude for farming. Restricted choices may be unavoidable with 
small targeted programs, especially with volatile populations. In general, however, as governments and large aid 
agencies look to programs like these for evidence, we feel that informed choice will be centrally important to any 
large-scale, nation-wide training and employment programs. Any program that enabled youth to make informed 
choices and sort themselves into professions for which they have more aptitude is likely to raise impacts overall. 
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9. Appendix: A statistics primer 
We set out to write a report that is free of excessive technical jargon. Whenever possible, we tried to present find-
ings in meaningful terms, our prose aided by several tables and figures. While we believe that the lessons of the 
report can be understood without a background in statistics, there are a few concepts that are good to review.  
Average, mean and median 
The average, or mean, is simply the sum of all values for the group divided by the number of people in that group. 
It is not the only way to measure the central tendency of a group of numbers, or the difference between two 
groups, however. Because means can be distorted by extreme values—people who do really well or really poorly—
we sometimes report the median, the precise middle value in the group (the 50
th
 percentile). Both are common 
measures of central tendency. 
Impact or effect size 
Simply put, impact refers to the size of the difference between groups when evaluating outcomes. In this report, 
impact will often be stated as the average difference between people who received the program (the treatment 
group) and people who did not (controls). This difference can be framed as an absolute value (e.g., increase of $x 
in income for the average beneficiary) or as a percentage increase relative to the control group (e.g., the treatment 
effect is equivalent to an increase of 50% over the control group mean). 
Statistical significance and confidence intervals 
When we calculate an average treatment effect, we compare the average in the treatment group to the average in 
the control group. Both groups contain a great deal of variation, and this implies that any average treatment effect 
is measured with error. This error decreases as we increase the number of people in the sample and the precision 
of measurement. But some uncertainty always remains. 
 
In any study, the default hypothesis is always that there is no treatment effect. When we detect an average differ-
ence between the treatment and control group, at a minimum we want to know whether or not we can say with 
confidence that the result is not zero, or runs in the opposite direction. 
 
In statistics, a result is called statistically significant if it is unlikely to have occurred by chance, and the amount of 
evidence required to accept that an event is unlikely to have arisen by chance is known as the significance level. 
Conventionally, we regard a result as statistically significant if there is a less than 5% risk that it is not zero. Some-
times a 10% risk is accepted, but the convention is typically 5%. 
 
Of course, we are not merely satisfied to know that a result is not zero. We would like to know the possible range 
of error of our average treatment effect. How high or low could the true value be? One way to evaluate our results 
is to report confidence intervals. Confidence intervals tell us the range of values that our finding could take with 
95% significance. For instance, we might report that the average effect size is $50, but because there is some error 
in this estimate, we would also report that the “true” effect size falls somewhere between $30 and $70 with 95% 
confidence.  
 
 
 
 
 
